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What is distinctive about human thought? 
Tim Crane 
 
It is one thing to give an inaugural lecture, but quite another thing to give an inaugural 
lecture as the occupant of a chair as distinguished as the Knightbridge professorship 
in the University of Cambridge. The Knightbridge chair belongs among the oldest 
established chairs in the University, and it is a honour and a privilege to occupy it. 
 John Knightbridge, a fellow of Peterhouse and vicar of Spofforth in Yorkshire, 
died in 1677, leaving in his Will the instruction that a ‘Professor of Moral Theology 
and Casuisticall Divinity’ be paid the annual sum of fifty pounds to read five lectures 
in the University every term. Knightbridge specified that the Professor be ‘the age of 
fifty yeares’; but because it was impossible to find someone of that age, and because 
Knightbridge’s will was initially considered invalid, the first Knightbridge Professor, 
Thomas Smoult, was appointed in 1682, five years after Knightbridge died. 
 Knightbridge left his legacy to the Master and Fellows of Peterhouse, so it is 
particularly satisfying for me to return the Knightbridge professorship to the college 
where I studied in the 1980s, since it was (so cruelly) taken away from the College in 
1838. Unfortunately, however, it is hard to see the parade of 18
th
 century 
Knightbridge Professors from Peterhouse as bringing the college lasting glory – 
painful as it is to admit this. Some, like Edmund Law, made contributions to the 
theological debates of their day. Law was also Master of Peterhouse, and the decision 
over who should succeed him in 1787 led to one of the most notorious periods in the 
College’s history.  
The Fellows’ choice as Law’s successor was the Knightbridge Professor, 
George Borlase (described by a contemporary as ‘close, dark and reserved’ – 
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attributes well represented in this portrait by George Romney). But in order to prevent 
the Bishop of Ely appointing someone they did not want, they presented the Bishop 
with only two choices: Borlase and Francis Barnes, a fellow of Trinity. Barnes has 
been described as little qualified ‘for the discharge of any duty which required the 
exercise of high notions of morality and a careful regard to what is just, decent and 
venerable’.1 He has also been described as the last man in Cambridge to wear a wig 
(but from personal experience, I find that rather hard to believe). The Fellows 
assumed that the Bishop would never choose Barnes; but they were wrong and Barnes 
reigned over Peterhouse for fifty years. It is said that the Bursar of the College, 
Francis Dawes, committed suicide because he felt so responsible for this bungled 
decision. 
Barnes was elected Knightbridge Professor by taking advantage of a clause in 
Knightbridge’s will: that ‘if it should happen that there should be discord in the 
election, that is to say two for one and two for another, then the Master of Peterhouse 
shall have the casting voice’. Barnes was one of the electors to the chair, in his role as 
Vice-Chancellor of the University. He was also one of the electors as Master of 
Peterhouse. He was also a candidate. The other two electors were opposed to him, so 
there was a tie, since Barnes had two votes. Barnes used his casting vote as Master of 
Peterhouse to elect himself to the post, which he held for twenty-five years. 
Even by the standards of corrupt and drunken 18
th
 century Cambridge, this 
was a pretty dismal state of affairs. The shadow of the disagreeable Barnes has 
lingered in the College. Soon after I arrived one somewhat elderly fellow greeted me 
by saying ‘so you are the Knightbridge Professor! But that is hilarious!’ ‘Why?’ 
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‘Well, because of Francis Barnes of course’. Obviously I was meant to know the 
story. 
 So I’m somewhat sorry to have to admit that it was only after the 
professorship left Peterhouse that it was occupied by philosophers of lasting 
distinction. William Whewell was a Fellow of Trinity College, and his work on 
induction is still studied today. He was once described to me as the last person who 
was capable of having a synoptic and encyclopedic knowledge of the science of his 
day. (He is also apparently the inventor of the word ‘scientist’.) One of the most 
distinguished occupants of the chair was Henry Sidgwick, and he was followed in the 
twentieth century by a series of influential thinkers, including C.D. Broad, Richard 
Braithwaite and Bernard Williams. Putting these together with my three eminent 
living predecessors Timothy Smiley, Edward Craig and Quassim Cassam, the phrase 
‘a hard act to follow’ looks something of an understatement. That said, I turn to my 




There is a tendency today to see philosophy as a ‘technical’ subject in the sense that it 
requires specific technical knowledge or a specific technique or method (like 
engineering or chemistry). It is true that philosophy is sometimes intricate, and it 
sometimes needs its own special vocabulary or logical machinery; and always, it must 
be disciplined. But it remains the case that many of the questions with which we are 
concerned arise out of tensions, puzzles, mysteries and paradoxes in our thinking 
which are as simple to understand as they seem impossible to solve.  
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 So it is, I think, with the question which is my concern tonight. What is the 
difference between human thought and the thoughts of other animals? The puzzle or 
mystery here is not hard to grasp. On the one hand, we believe that animals do have 
some kind of inner life or mental life. There is something it is like to be a dog, or a 
chimp, or a bat. But when we reflect on what this might be like, we draw a blank. It 
seems utterly mysterious to us. 
 It’s not that we have no idea what animals are doing when they seem to do 
things purposively. And it’s not that we have no idea why they are doing what they 
are doing. It’s just that we can’t envisage or describe to ourselves or otherwise 
imagine what it is like for them. The cartoonist Gary Larson, whose works are full of 
philosophical insight, made fun of our predicament in these famous cartoons. There’s 
what we say to dogs; and there’s what they hear. There’s what we say to cats; and 
what they hear. Or maybe the inner lives of dogs are much more like ours than we 
think.  
Of course, the joke here is that we know they are not – as Rai Gaita once put 
it, we can conceive of a dog making a mistake, but we it doesn’t make much sense 
that a dog might make a mess of its life (‘at that point, Fido made a couple of bad 
decisions and everything started going downhill…’). But why are we so sure of these 
things? And if we are so sure – which I think we should be – how should we describe 
the differences between the ways humans and animals think? 
I was fortunate in preparing for this lecture in being helped by Jenni Lecky 
Thompson, who provided these very nice photos. This one is familiar. This one may 
be less so, as may this. Why do we find these funny, and Rodin’s original not? The 
image of Rodin’s Thinker may be a cliché – it occurs on the website of almost every 
university philosophy department. But it is not funny, like this one is. Why? It’s partly 
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because of the uncanny mixture of familiarity and strangeness which we encounter 
when observing apes – the kind of thing that makes a gorilla in a zoo resemble 
nothing more than a man in a gorilla suit. But surely it’s also because the idea of an 
ape or a monkey speculating is slightly absurd. This is the line of thought I would like 
to explore this evening. 
It might be thought that my question – what is distinctive of human thought? – 
is one which can only be solved by scientific inquiry. In what I am going to say in a 
moment, I will certainly appeal to scientific evidence, but it is worth pausing to 
consider the idea that we can only consult science here. How exactly should we 
proceed, as scientists? By scanning the brains of apes and humans? By staring at the 
few percent of the DNA which we do not share with chimps? The problem is that we 
have no idea what we are looking for. This, I think, is why we need the relatively 
abstract level of speculation which is characteristic of philosophy. 
 Philosophy, I believe, is not science, though it is (among other things) a search 
for the truth about its various subject-matters. And one thing that distinguishes 
philosophy from science is that the views of the philosophers of the past can still be 
relevant to us. This can be either because we should take care to avoid their errors, or 
because we need to get a sufficient distance from our own assumptions, or because we 
want to avoid reinventing the wheel. In this connection I’d like to endorse a remark 
by one of the more under-rated Knightbridge Professors, C.D. Broad: 
 
It appears to me that the best preparation for original work on any philosophic 
problem is to study the solutions which have been proposed for it by men of 
genius whose views differ from each other as much as possible. The clash of 
their opinions may strike a light which will enable us to avoid the mistakes 
into which they have fallen; and by noticing the strong and weak points of 
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So let’s proceed by taking Broad’s advice, then, and asking what some of the 




Aristotle begins his metaphysics with the famous sentence, ‘All men by nature desire 
to know’. He goes on to say that ‘an indication of this is the delight we take in our 
senses, for even apart from their usefulness they are loved for themselves’.3 He then 
contrasts the way other animals ‘live by appearances and memories’ but ‘the human 
race lives by art and reasoning’. Knowledge and understanding ‘belong to art rather 
than to experience’, because art, not experience, teaches you the ‘why’ of things. I 
agree with Jonathan Lear that when Aristotle says that by nature we desire to know, 
he was referring to the desire to know for its own sake.
4
 Lear argues that the urge to 
philosophise arises out of such a desire: ‘For Aristotle, philosophy begins with 
questions and puzzles. We are led to the pursuit of explanations for their own sake 
both by our natural makeup – the desire to know – and because it is part of our nature 
to find the world puzzling’.5 
This, then, will be the aim of my lecture: to defend Aristotle’s view that it is in 
our nature to seek knowledge for its own sake. 
What is knowledge for its own sake? We can draw a distinction between a 
piece of knowledge being valuable because of some further purpose or good it might 
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serve, and a piece of knowledge being something which is an end in itself. Similarly, 
we draw a distinction between something’s having value because it is a means to a 
further end, and something which is valuable because it is an end in itself. Some 
things must be ends in themselves, if anything is to be of value at all; and what 
applies to value here also applies to knowledge. 
Consider someone who is interested in learning about the stars. We could 
distinguish someone’s having a purely instrumental interest in the stars – for example 
to aid navigation at sea. And perhaps this is where our interest in the stars comes 
from. But on the face of it this kind of interest in the stars is different from the interest 
of someone who simply wants to know about the constellation of Orion, pictured 
here, or who wants to know how far away the stars are, or which stars are brighter. 
This kind of knowledge is not put at the service of any practical project, but is simply 
something that is pursued for its own sake. 
There is a way of trivializing the distinction between instrumental knowledge 
and knowledge for its own sake. This would be to say that even in the case where 
someone simply wants to look at the skies, their knowledge is instrumental because it 
its role is to satisfy the desires of the agent. Any agent who wants to know something 
has some desires – notably the desire to know these things – and these desires would 
be satisfied by the achievement of knowledge. Since the search for knowledge is 
always driven by the desire – as perhaps all searches are, if Aristotle is right that 
‘thought by itself moves nothing’ – then this knowledge would be instrumental too, in 
the sense that its role is to satisfy the desire for knowledge. 
We can grudgingly agree that all knowledge is instrumental in this anodyne 
sense. But if we insist that this is the only sense in which all knowledge is 
instrumental, then we will miss the distinction which (I claim) is crucial for 
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understanding human thought. The distinction we need is between knowledge which 
is pursued because of the desire for knowledge on that subject-matter as such, and 
knowledge which is pursued because it will help some aim or purpose distinct from 
the desire to know. 
Some philosophical accounts of thought treat all thought as instrumental. 
Thinking about the world must be explained in terms of the satisfaction of needs, 
urges and desires. An extreme example is evolutionary psychology, which looks for 
explanations of human cognitive capacities as adaptations, that is as developments 
across generations of those traits which have enhanced the ‘fitness’ of organisms. For 
the moment I would like to look more closely at one philosophical attempt to ground 
all thought on the satisfaction of desire. 
In a famous paper, F.P. Ramsey described a view he called ‘pragmatism’: that 
beliefs could be characterized by their effects in action. The idea (later to be called 
‘functionalism’) is that because what we do is fixed in part by what we believe and 
what we want, we should attempt to understand believing and wanting as dispositions 
to act in certain ways. 
Ramsey went further, and attempted to define what it is to believe one thing 
rather than another in terms of the actions they would give rise to in certain 
circumstances. He illustrated this with the simple case of a chicken: ‘We can say that 
a chicken believes a certain sort of caterpillar to be poisonous, and mean by that 
merely that it abstains from eating such caterpillars on account of unpleasant 
experiences connected with them’. Generalising from this, he defines a belief in terms 
of the actions it would cause, and the ‘content’ of a belief (labeled with the letter ‘p’) 
in terms of its utility: ‘any set of actions for whose utility p is a necessary and 
 9 
sufficient condition might be called a belief that p, and so would be true if p, i.e. if 
they were useful’.6 
 Ramsey’s view that beliefs should be understood in terms of their utility is a 
version of the view that all thought is instrumental. Jamie Whyte labeled this view 
‘success semantics’, and it has been defended by a number of philosophers, including 
Hugh Mellor here in Cambridge. Beliefs are often said to be distinguished by their 
‘truth-conditions’: the conditions under which they are true. So for example, my 
belief that the sun is shining is the belief it is because the belief is true in just those 
conditions in which the sun is shining. Success semantics says that the truth-
conditions of a belief are its success conditions: the conditions under which actions 
based on it would succeed, where success is understood as the satisfaction of wants or 
desires. So, if what I want is to walk to Granchester but I only want to do it if the sun 
is shining, then my desire and my belief will cause me to attempt to achieve that. The 
conditions under which the belief is true are the conditions under which actions based 
on it succeed. It follows that belief (and therefore thought in my sense) must be 
defined instrumentally in terms of possible success of actions. 
 I don’t want to deny that this kind of relationship between belief, desire and 
action may hold for many actions and mental states (not just the kinds that we might 
credit to chickens, but to human beings too). The relation between the success of our 
actions – the achievement of our objectives or goals – and the truth of our beliefs 
must be an essential part of the whole story. But since it characterizes the truth-
conditions of a belief in terms of the success-conditions of a desire, it owes us an 
account of the satisfaction conditions of desires. The satisfaction of a desire cannot 
simply be the cessation of desire, as Russell once thought; for a desire can cease even 
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if it is not satisfied. Rather, the satisfaction of desire must be what Whyte calls its 
fulfillment: bringing about a certain condition. But if bringing about this condition 
cannot be understood except in terms of the truth of a proposition, then this is what 
we are trying to explain. The problem is especially acute when the desires concern 
desires to find out something for its own sake: for in this case, the satisfaction of a 
desire just is the acquisition of a true belief. We are moving around in a very small 
circle. 
 Success semantics has a lot to be said for it; but I doubt whether it is the whole 
story since I doubt whether it can have anything informative to say about the pursuit 
of knowledge for its own sake. So I shall put it to one side here, without having 
pretended to have refuted it. 
 At this stage it might be objected that the line of thought I have been 
developing here has ignored the obvious difference between human and animal 
thought: the fact that our thought, unlike theirs, is expressed in language. Of course, 
this is an obvious difference. (We should ignore, I think, the evidence from so-called 
‘linguistic apes’, which accordingly to one recent authority is ‘mostly anecdotal, 
lacking in systematic detail and often involves over-interpretation’.7) In any case, 
what is uncontroversial is that we are the only species who develop language in the 
course of normal ontogenetic development. But what is the significance of this 
difference for our understanding of thought? Does language simply make possible a 
more complex kind of thought or is there some difference of kind that language 
provides? 
Descartes is famous for having denied thought to animals, partly on the 
grounds that they could not speak. (Descartes’s Cambridge contemporary Henry More 
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called this an ‘internecine and murderous view’.)  In the 20th century, Donald 
Davidson (himself hardly a natural Cartesian) agreed with Descartes. Davidson’s idea 
was that to be a thinker is to be the interpreter of the thought of another, which 
essentially involves employing a language. So non-linguistic animals cannot think. 
Why does he think this? 
Davidson’s argument focuses on what it is to have a belief. It is based on two 
assumptions: first, that in order to have a belief, one must have the concept of belief; 
and second, that to have the concept of belief, one must have language.
8
 It is a 
consequence of this that any creature which has beliefs must have a language. The 
more detailed line of thought is that to have the concept of belief requires mastering 
the distinction between how things seem and how they are. Davidson argues that 
language would suffice for making this distinction, and conjectures that nothing else 
would make it. 
Davidson’s argument is controversial and has persuaded few. In particular, the 
premise that one can only have beliefs if one has the concept of belief is crucially 
unsupported, and without that, there is no reason to accept his conclusion, and no 
reason to deny thought to non-linguistic animals. In the relevant sense, a belief can be 
a simple representational state, which Ramsey’s chicken can have. We can call the 
chicken’s belief a belief that chickens are poisonous if we like, but this does not 
require that we attribute to the chicken the ‘concept’ of poison. Calling this a belief is 
just a way of indicating that the chicken represents the world in a way that guides its 
actions, and in way that can be correct or incorrect. 
In order to have this ‘belief’ the chicken needs no beliefs about its beliefs. For 
example, it need not be surprised if it eats a caterpillar and does not have an 
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unpleasant experience. It need not discover that it was wrong. It just moves on, 
updating its representations accordingly. Being surprised, Davidson argues, requires 
that one distinguishes between how one previously thought the world was, and how 
one now discovers it is. I think Davidson is quite right about that. But he is wrong to 
think that being a believer requires that one is capable of surprise. 
However, although Davidson’s argument fails, it contains something which 
gives us a clue as to how to answer our question: what does language add to thought? 
(Or, what kind of thought does language make possible?) Davidson argued that 
having the concept of belief involves making the distinction between how things seem 
and how they are. This amounts to having the concept of error. And it turns out that 
there is evidence that although apes can form beliefs about mental states, there is no 
evidence that they have anything like the concept of error.  
 In a series of striking experiments, Brian Hare, Josep Call and Michael 
Tomasello (2001) provided evidence that chimpanzees can know what other 
chimpanzees can see, and therefore what they know. The essence of the experiment 
involved a dominant and a subservient chimp, and two situations. In the first situation, 
food was placed accessibly in front of the subservient chimp in full view of the 
dominant chimp; the subservient chimp did not move. In the second situation, an 
opaque barrier was placed between the dominant and the subservient, so that the food 
could not be seen by the dominant; in this case, the subservient chimp took the food. 
The irresistible explanation is that in the second situation, the subservient chimp knew 
that the dominant ape could not see the food. 
 In 1978 David Premack and Guy Woodruff asked the question, ‘Does the 
chimpanzee have a theory of mind?’ It seems to me that these kinds of experiment 
(among many others) indicate that we should give an affirmative answer to the 
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question – so long as we do not build too much into the term ‘theory’. Having a 
‘theory’ of mind in this sense is just having a conception of other creatures’ mental 
states. But these experiments also suggest something about what kind of theory of 
mind they have. The chimps have beliefs about what other chimps can know or see. 
But – and this is the point I want to stress – there is no evidence that they have beliefs 
about what other chimps believe. What is the difference? 
 The classic test for testing for ‘theory of mind’ in infants is known as the false 
belief test, invented by Perner and Wimmer in 1983, and later developed by Baron-
Cohen, Frith and Leslie. Children are told a story (illustrated by dolls or by human 
experimenters) in which character A in the story puts (say) a marble in a box, in view 
of the other character B. Character B leaves the room and character A removes the 
marble and hides it somewhere else. When B returns, the child is asked, ‘where does 
B think the marble is?’ Above a certain age (about four) children give the ‘right’ 
answer: in the box. But younger children often answer that B thinks the marble is 
where A hid it. In short, they have no understanding that B is in error, or has a false 
belief. 
 There is, to the best of my knowledge, no evidence that apes can pass the false 
belief test, and lots of evidence that they cannot.
9
 But chimps do seem to have beliefs 
about the mental states of other chimps. How should this be explained? 
 The distinction we need is the distinction between ignorance and error. The 
subordinate chimp knew that the dominant chimp could not see the food – that it was 
ignorant of this fact. There is no evidence that they show any awareness of the mental 
states being correct or incorrect. The mental states that this experimental paradigm 
reveals are what we might call relational mental states: knowledge, seeing, wanting. 
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These are states of mind that relate the thinker to the environment, and so cannot, in a 
certain sense, be wrong. Beliefs, on the other hand, are the kinds of thing that can be 
wrong. But there is no evidence that chimps can show any awareness of these kinds of 
state in conspecifics. 
 So unlike the chimp’s conception, the child’s maturing conception of mind 
introduces a representation of error. What is it to represent someone as in error? At 
the very least, it involves the recognition by one creature that the world is not the way 
the other creature represents it as being. The ability to hold these two representations 
in your mind – how the other represents something, and how it really is – is one of the 
things that distinguishes human infants from adult chimps, our nearest relatives.  
 It is clear that the way mature humans normally represent others as being 
correct or incorrect is showing agreement or assent, or by using the words for these 
things, ‘correct’ or ‘incorrect’ (or the words ‘true’ and ‘false’ – but sometimes I 
suspect that only philosophers use these words). This suggests to me that Davidson 
was on the right track to think that there is a link between having the concept of belief 
and having a language. The link is this: it is when a creature has a language that it can 
easily and systematically represent the beliefs of others as being correct or incorrect. 
Children can do it at the age of four or five. Without language, it is very hard to see 
how they could do this. Very hard: I do not say impossible. But like Davidson, I 
cannot clearly see any other way in which it can be done. 
The significance of language, on this view of things, is not simply that it 
allows us to communicate, or even that it allows a more sophisticated kind of 
communication – although both these things are true. The other extra thing that 
language gives us is that it facilitates and gives us a mechanism to articulate the 





So far I have claimed that one of the things that distinguishes us from apes is the fact 
that we have the concept of belief (and therefore the concepts of truth or error) and 
they do not. I’ve also claimed that language facilitates our representation of the 
correctness of the thoughts of others. I would now like to connect this with my earlier 
theme of the desire for knowledge for its own sake.  
To want to know something for its own sake is not to want it because it is true 
– if ‘because it is true’ is supposed to be an intelligible answer to the question ‘why 
do you want to know that?’ My colleague Jane Heal has put this point well, when 
discussing the idea that ‘the disinterested search for truth’ might be a value in itself:  
 
When someone claims that information on a certain topic would be a good 
thing one can always ask “Why do you want to know about that?” An 
intelligible answer will have to say something about that particular subject 
matter. It cannot simply point back to the fact that the item in question would 





But, Heal goes on, just because being ‘true’ can never be an intelligible answer to the 
question, this does not mean that an intelligible answer must always be to specify 
some practical project: 
 
to say that an answer [to the question, ‘why do you want to know about that?’] 
must be forthcoming is not to say that the form of the answer must involve 
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Heal here points out the false contrast between the illusory idea that one might simply 
search for truth ‘as such’, just because it is true, and the perfectly correct (but I would 
argue, essentially limited) idea that our beliefs and desires serve our practical needs. 
There is, as she indicates, a third option: one might be interested in the truth about a 
certain subject-matter for its own sake. 
 When one is investigating a subject matter for its own sake, one is not 
pursuing the truth ‘just because it is true’; but nonetheless, one must think of oneself 
as governed by the norm or standard of getting it right. The amateur star-gazer who 
plots the changing positions of the stars over the year is doing it because of an interest 
in the stars, but if asked to reflect on what he is aiming to do, he should answer that he 
just wants to find out how things are up there. And for a ‘rational animal’ like our 
star-gazer the way to do it is to try and avoid error; and if you are going to try and 
avoid error, you had better have the concept of error in the first place. 
 We want to avoid error in the simplest instrumental cases, of course: we 
wonder whether we are right about where the food is, or whether we are right about 
where the predators are. We would be unable to wonder about these things if we did 
not have the concept of error. But once we have this concept, it can govern our 
thinking about non-instrumental subject-matters too, such as our interest in the stars. 
If we consciously wonder whether we are getting it right, then we must be capable of 
consciously employing the concept of error. 
 My conjecture, then, is that what is distinctive about human thought is the 
ability to pursue epistemic goals, independently of practical ends or the satisfaction of 
any desire except the desire to know: human thinkers sometimes pursue knowledge 
for its own sake. If this were true, then it would give a clear account of the striking 





How might one go about testing such a conjecture? Of course, conceptual or a priori 
arguments and connections are important, but ultimately one will look for empirical 
evidence and actual studies of animal and human thought. 
Between 2005 and 2008 I was involved in an interdisciplinary research group 
on the origins of what is known as ‘referential communication’ – that is, 
communication with other animals about objects in the environment. (The group was 
funded by those masters of linguistic communication, the European Union, as part of 
their obscurely titled ‘Framework Programme 7’, sub-heading ‘New and Emerging 
Science and Technology’, acronym NEST… ‘It’s English Jim, but not as we know it’; 
one should not mock the hand that feeds one.) The other members of this group were 
animal psychologists working on dogs, parrots, dolphins, and our closest relatives, 
chimpanzees, bonobos and gorillas. My role in the project was to attempt to clarify 
and articulate the central concepts assumed by the many of the psychological projects 
– in particular, reference, communication, intention and intentionality.12 
A classic paradigm of referential communication in animals is the alarm calls 
of vervet monkeys, as revealed in the pioneering studies of Cheney and Seyfarth 
(1990). Vervet monkeys in the wild employ a number of distinct calls to indicate to 
other monkeys the presence of different kinds of predator. The hypothesis that this is 
referential communication is the hypothesis that these animals are communicating not 
about their inner states (fear, anger or something like that) or trying to command other 
monkeys to do things (‘flee!’ ‘Run for it!’ and so on). Rather, the monkeys are aiming 




to inform other monkeys of something in their environment – which predator is 
coming – so that they will be able to take the appropriate evasive action (run up a tree 
if it is a leopard, hide under a bush if it is an eagle etc). 
The evidence for referential communication among animals is mixed. One 
team went to watch gorillas in a nature reserve in Africa to study their gestures. But 
they found that gorillas made almost no gestures in the wild. The attempts to establish 
that parrots referentially communicate parrots got nowhere. The extent to which dogs 
follow the gaze of humans is still disputed. But where there was evidence for 
referential communication, it generally conformed to the model of the vervet 
monkeys: communication is geared to specific, immediate goals and very ‘domain-
specific’ tasks: getting food, avoiding predators, mating and so on. 
One topic though, the phenomenon of pointing, is of particular interest to me 
here. In the study of non-linguistic communicative devices, the study of pointing has 
(unsurprisingly) been the focus of a lot of research. Among human infants, there are 
two kinds of pointing.
13
 Infants point when they want something, or want an adult to 
give them something (‘juice!’). This is known as ‘imperative’ pointing. But they also 
point when they want to share attention with an adult, to draw their attention to 
something in the environment – this is ‘declarative’ pointing (the kind of pointing we 
might think of as the child saying ‘look at that!’).  
What about animals? Dogs have a limited understanding pointing, as we shall 
see, and despite the name of this famous breed, there is little reason to think that they 
point themselves. But attempts to discern pointing in apes has met with mixed 
success. There seems to be almost no evidence of pointing in the wild, although some 
apes who have lived with humans occasionally point imperatively. But – and this is 
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the interesting result for me – there is no evidence of declarative pointing in apes, 
anywhere, at any time. As Michael Tomasello has put it: ‘no apes in any kind of 
environment produce, either for other apes or for humans, acts of pointing that serve 
functions other than the imperative functions.’14  
What should we conclude from this? It seems to me that declarative pointing 
is what one would expect if there something like a psychological mechanism of pure 
curiosity: unlike instrumental pointing, declarative pointing can manifest a sheer 
interest in something with no especial need for a practical upshot (as Aristotle said, 
‘not only with a view to action, but even when we are not going to do anything, we 
prefer seeing (one might say) to everything else’). 
My tentative conclusion is that there is no evidence that non-human animals 
ever pursue a purely intellectual epistemic goal: their investigations of the 
environment are always for the sake of satisfying some other immediate goal: for 
food, shelter, sex, play or to engage other animals in collaborative pursuit of some of 
these goals. If pursuing a purely intellectual epistemic goal requires that one have the 
concept of error, as I have just argued, then the absence of a concept of error would 
go some way towards explaining why this is so. 
What about the evidence for humans? If my point is that humans have some 
capacity which animals have not, then we would expect evidence from humans as 
well as from animals. The evidence from animals points in a negative direction. The 
evidence from humans comes, of course, partly from our own reflection on our own 
capacity. But the further theoretical question is: why do we have this capacity? How 
did it come about, both in the sense of how it develops in the life of an organism, as 
well as how did it come about in the development of the species? 
                                                        
14
 Michael Tomasello, Origins of Human Communication (2008) 37-8 
 20 
The developmental psychologists György Gergely and Gergely Csibra have 
recently proposed a novel theory of learning in human infants, which they call 
‘Natural Pedagogy’. Their extensive experimental work on pre-linguistic infants 
strongly suggests that infants have an ability to learn very quickly what they call 
‘generic’ and ‘cognitively opaque’ information. Information is ‘generic’, obviously 
enough, when it can be put to more than one use. And information is ‘cognitively 
opaque’ when the infants have no idea what the function or purpose of what is being 
communicated is. They learn to do certain things by imitation even when what they 
are learning has no obvious point. In a well-known experiment, for example, infants 
learned to turn on a lamp with their heads by copying the experimenter. It turns out 
that the infants copy the experimenter whether or not the experimenter’s hands are 
free. The interpretation is that the infant does not copy the experimenter only when 
her hands are occupied; it simply copies, according to Gergely and Csibra, because it 
has an innate capacity to recognize an occasion as one in which an adult is trying to 
communicate something to them. Infants are naturally sensitive to certain situations as 
communication situations. It is this hypothesized innate adapative capacity to 
recognize such situations that Gergely and Csibra call ‘Natural Pedagogy’.  
The Natural Pedagogy hypothesis has a couple of intruiging connections with 
the rather grand thesis I am defending in this lecture. For one thing, nothing like 
Natural Pedagogy has been discovered or hypothesized in apes, and it is famously 
difficult to train apes to learn generic information. Dogs, who have evolved alongside 
human beings, do seem to be sensitive to human attempts to communicate – as we 
saw, by responding to pointing. (Interestingly, wolves – even those reared by humans 
– are not.)  
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But the dogs’ sensitivity to these situations is limited, in a very interesting 
way. As Pierre Jacob has nicely put it, ‘In dogs, the sensitivity to ostensive 
communicative signals seems tied to particular individuals and primarily hooked to a 
motivational system whose goal is to satisfy human orders.’15 The infants’ ability to 
recognize the communicative situation is much more flexible across different 
contexts, and the information they learn is often ‘cognitively opaque’: that is, it is not 
tied to any particular practical activity or motivation.  
I don’t think it is too fanciful to see a link here to the idea of the search for 
knowledge for its own sake. If Gergely and Csibra are right, and human infants have 
an innate capacity for the acquisition of cognitively opaque information, then could 
this capacity be the ontogenetic psychological basis for what I am claiming to be 
distinctively human, the interest in knowledge for its own sake? 
 
*** 
I have been attempting to argue that, in a sense, Aristotle was right: we do naturally 
desire to know, and that we sometimes desire to know things for their own sake. We 
pursue epistemic goals, I have claimed, independently of their practical consequences.  
In itself, this claim might be obvious enough. The controversy comes in the claim that 
this is distinctively human, and in how the evidence is supposed to support the claim. 
I have argued that both philosophical considerations (for example about what the 
concept of belief requires) and empirical evidence (from animals and humans) support 
the thesis that the disinterested search for truth might be what distinguishes us from 
other animals. 





Some might say that empirical evidence can never have any impact on a 
philosophical thesis, and that the only relevant considerations can be ‘a priori’ or 
conceptual. It would be easier to evaluate this suggestion if its defenders were able to 
say a little more about what distinguishes the conceptual or the a priori. But in any 
case, it is hard to understand why what distinguishes us from animals should be 
something which can only be established ‘conceptually’. The approach taken here 
contrasts also with one approach inspired by Wittgenstein, whose writings have 
(whether correctly or not) inspired a kind of quietism or conservativism about the 
mind: nothing we can learn about the brain or about other animals in the wild can tell 
us anything about the nature of our thought.  
I am opposed both to the Wittgensteinian view and to the a priori view. Since 
we cannot discern sharp boundaries between different realms of knowledge, we 
should take ideas and evidence from wherever seems relevant. To borrow the words 
of another former Knightbridge professor, ‘if we believe that philosophy might play 
an important part in making people think about what they are doing, then philosophy 
should acknowledge its connections with other ways of understanding ourselves, and 
if it insists on not doing so, it may seem … in every sense quite peculiar’.16 It is in the 
spirit of these remarks that I present my proposal to you this evening. Thank you very 
much for your attention. 
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